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Abstract
This article provides a reappraisal of the first earl of Shaftesbury (1621–83) and chal-
lenges his reputation as an unprincipled politician. Conversely, it is argued that
Shaftesbury’s opposition to both Cromwell during the Protectorate and Charles II in
the Restoration was guided by a resolute ‘conscience’. While there was certainly elasti-
city in his conduct, Shaftesbury was very much the product of a political education
framed during the Civil War and Commonwealth eras. The article explicitly demon-
strates through an exposition of his activity and thought in the 1650s and 1670s that
four guiding values remained consistent in his career. Both periods were shaped by con-
cerns over political and religious tyranny by an overbearing executive and a threat to
‘lives, liberty, and property’ from the ruler, the church, and the army. Shaftesbury’s signifi-
cance lies in the aristocratic constitutionalism he believed offered a restraint to encroach-
ment by the executive and the people in government. Relying upon long-established
traditions that positioned the nobility as an independent bridle against arbitrary govern-
ment, Shaftesbury suggested a forward-thinking vision of elite rule supported by the peo-
ple. In clarifying Shaftesbury’s values, the article rejects interpretations of him as a
republican, Neo-Harringtonian, or a believer in popular government (democracy).
King Charles II’s maverick lord chancellor, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the first
earl of Shaftesbury (1621–83), remains a much misunderstood and maligned
figure today. Famously portrayed by John Dryden as the disingenuous and self-
serving biblical counsellor Achitophel to King Charles II’s naïve illegitimate
son the duke of Monmouth, this depiction has largely survived.1 His capacity
to change sides – from the royalists to parliamentarians, to working for
Oliver Cromwell before opposing him, a feat repeated under Charles II – gained
him a reputation as an unprincipled, disloyal man determined to aggrandize
his own position and fame. Yet this representation is specious. Shaftesbury
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0),
which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
1 [John Dryden], Absalom and Achitophel. A poem (London, 1681).
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may well offer an example of an early ‘Trimmer’, like his nephew Lord Halifax,
but his pre-1660 political education found him surrounded by numerous pre-
trimmers. The Civil War (1642–9) and Commonwealth (1649–60) eras contained
many men willing to switch sides as well as unite with strange ideological bed-
fellows in politics. Conversely, Shaftesbury’s aptitude for transferring alle-
giances was directed by a resolute ‘conscience’ and four unwavering values
that motivated his political career.
These four (concatenating) principles – the application of the rule of law,
hostility to multiple forms of tyranny, a belief in a free parliament reformed
by the nobility, and the liberty and rights for the people – look unremarkable
within their context, and in relation to more recent reappraisals concerning
Shaftesbury. It has been frequently claimed that Shaftesbury was opposed to
tyranny in the form of arbitrary monarchy and (French) Catholicism, which
made him suspicious of King Charles II’s political machinations and the
court and Commons’ acquiescence.2 Moreover, Shaftesbury’s solution to
reform a free (mixed) government along aristocratic lines to provide liberty
and religious toleration (for Protestants) has also been noted.3 Nevertheless,
this does not reflect the nuances of his outlook and has led to the mistaken
conclusions that Shaftesbury promoted popular sovereignty to engender dem-
ocracy, or that he applied Neo-Harringtonian republican language to counter
Charles II.4 This article will demonstrate that his four values were driven by
a conviction that governance should be by the few rather than a single
ruler, the many, or an army. Cutting his political teeth between 1643 and
1660 imbued Shaftesbury with a strong distaste for arbitrary behaviour by
the executive, the use of religion to bolster political tyranny, and the threat
of the army towards free government potentially resulting in (democratic)
‘mechanic tyranny’.5 By concentrating on Shaftesbury’s speeches and conduct
in the 1650s and pre-Exclusion Crisis 1670s, the article will reveal the consist-
ency in his outlook and that much of his antagonism towards Charles II was
shaped by anxieties from a generation earlier. Clarification of Shaftesbury’s
objectives and thinking are important because his promulgation of a long-
standing aristocratic constitutionalism would ultimately gain traction
2 See W. D. Christie, A life of Anthony Ashley Cooper, first earl of Shaftesbury 1621–1683 (2 vols.,
London, 1871), II, pp. 184–5, 463–5; K. H. D. Haley, The first earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford, 1968),
pp. 251–3; and John Spurr, ‘Shaftesbury and the seventeenth century’, ch. 1 in John Spurr, ed.,
Anthony Ashley Cooper, first earl of Shaftesbury 1621–1683 (Farnham, 2011), p. 13.
3 See J. H. Plumb, ‘The first earl of Shaftesbury’, History Today, 3 (1953), pp. 267–8, 269–70; Alan
Marshall, ‘“Mechanic Tyrannie”: Anthony Ashley Cooper and the English Republic’, ch. 2 in Spurr,
ed., Anthony Ashley Cooper, pp. 37–9; and John Spurr, ‘Shaftesbury and the politics of religion’, ch. 6
in Spurr, ed., Anthony Ashley Cooper, pp. 130, 131–9.
4 For democratic Shaftesbury, see Haley, First earl, p. 739; and Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary
politics and Locke’s Two treatises of government (Princeton, NJ, 1986), pp. 165–9; and for
Neo-Harringtonian Shaftesbury, see J. G. A. Pocock, ‘Machiavelli, Harrington and English political
ideologies in the eighteenth century’, in Politics, language and time (London, 1972), p. 117; idem,
Machiavellian moment: Florentine political thought and the Atlantic republican tradition (Princeton, NJ,
1975), pp. 407–8; and idem, ‘Varieties of whiggism’, in Virtue, commerce and history: essays on political
thought and history, chiefly in the eighteenth century (Cambridge, 1985), p. 226.
5 John Evelyn, The diary of John Evelyn, III: (1677–1706) (London, 1996), pp. 103–4.
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post-1688 shaping England and Britain, and historiographically it removes him
from the republican tradition.
I
Despite an early career punctuated by periods of exclusion from parliament,
Cooper experienced a meteoric rise. After briefly sitting as a member of par-
liament aged eighteen in the Short Parliament of 1640, he took up arms for
Charles I in 1643 then fought for the parliamentary cause from March 1644.
Cooper was barred from parliament between 1645 and 1652 for his previous
association with the royalists, reappearing in the anarchic Barebones
Parliament of 1653. He became a member of the Commonwealth’s council of
state under Cromwell that year but left his government to oppose him from
December 1654.6 From 1659, he performed a valuable role in the council of
state, and in 1660 became one of the twelve commissioners sent to Holland
by the House of Commons to invite Charles II (r. 1660–85) to return to
England. As a reward, Cooper was appointed to the privy council, and from
1660 until 1673 he held office in the king’s government in roles that grew in
status as his intelligence, oratory, and ability was recognized, elevated to
Baron Ashley in 1661 and the earl of Shaftesbury and lord chancellor in
1672.7 Cooper served in the king’s ‘Cabinet Council’ from the late 1660s, was
notably involved in the Stop of the Exchequer policy, the Declaration of
Indulgence, and the Third Anglo-Dutch War (all initiated in 1672), before
resigning from the government in 1673. He remained in active opposition
for the rest of his life, becoming implicated in the Popish Plot (1678), the cam-
paign to exclude James, the duke of York, from the succession in the Exclusion
Crisis (1679–81), then fleeing to Holland and shortly afterwards dying when
(in)famously embroiled in the Rye House Plot (1683) conspiracy to kill
Charles II and the duke of York.
Cooper’s capacity for changing sides goes some way to understanding his
atrocious reputation within his own lifetime. He was reviled by opponents
and his political principles and pragmatism were interpreted as treachery,
sedition stoking, and rebellion. The pen-for-hire, Marchamont Nedham, a
man who also enjoyed a reputation for switching sides, referred to him as
‘MEPHISTOPHILES’, Dryden compared him with ‘the Devil’, and Nahum Tate
claimed that his penchant for manipulating the people was fuelled by ambition
for his own ‘Pow’r unlimited’ and desire to restore the popular government of
the Commonwealth era.8 Nevertheless, this denigration as a man of flexible
convictions is not accurate, and his core values were evident from the begin-
ning of his career after enlisting with the parliamentarians. In A copie of the
6 K. H. D. Haley, ‘Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1st earl of Shaftesbury, English politician [1621–1683]’,
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online (2008): www.britannica.com/biography/Anthony-Ashley-Cooper-1st-
earl-of-Shaftesbury.
7 Ibid.
8 See [Marchamont Nedham], A pacquet of advices and animadversions sent from London to the men of
Shaftesbury (London, 1676), pp. 4–5, 76; [Dryden], Absalom and Achitophel; and [Nahum Tate], The
second part of Absalom and Achitophel (London, 1682), pp. 1, 9, 6, 21, 23.
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kings message, Cooper attacked the Cavaliers for hindering ‘the rightful pro-
ceedings in Parliament’ and preventing it from addressing the country’s
evils. Furthermore, the royalists’ reliance upon French mercenaries who com-
mitted atrocities against the English people facilitated ‘barbarous
Blood-suckers and inhumane beasts, and all their abettors, [in] their indea-
vours…to extirpate our Religion and Liberty’.9 As a ‘moderate’, Cooper pro-
fessed to have switched sides because he was ‘following good conscience’,
unhappy with a ‘reckless, absolutist, Catholic faction’ within the royalists
who rewarded ‘soldiers of fortune’ for damaging the country.10
This intervention by Cooper generates two important considerations. First,
his aptitude for using emotive and eye-catching language to stir the reading
public and pull them to his opinion is evident from his early twenties. Key trig-
ger words or slogans of the day – such as ‘justice’, ‘Liberty’, ‘bondage’, ‘prop-
erty’, and ‘our Religion’ –were utilized as propaganda. His talent for
employing accessible rhetoric in his pamphlets was evident before his oppos-
ition in the Letter sent out of Wiltshire to a gentleman in London (1654). This work
has not been attributed to Cooper, but the targets of the pamphlet were under
no illusion that it had been written by ‘Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper’ using his lofty
perch amongst ‘the Saints’ in government to falsely accuse them of electio-
neering.11 During the 1654 election campaign in Wiltshire against the
Republicans, Cooper wanted to ensure he and ‘the right sort of people’ were
elected as MPs.12 Sharing the emotive language of the Copie, the Letter mani-
fests a common strategy of the time found in his later propaganda: reference
to hidden, dangerous factional plots that endanger an unwitting people. As the
Wiltshire election had exposed, in co-operation with the ‘Cavaliers’, the
‘Clergie of the Nation’ wanted to place the people under ‘Egyptian bondage’
by filling parliament with placemen and ministers to carry out their
‘designe’.13 These ‘false, vile Christians’ driven by their ‘carnall weapons’
were motivated by ‘worldly honour, and popular applause’ and guilty of mis-
leading ‘the generality of the injudicious people, by [their]…false and malicious
imputations’.14
This exploitation of ‘injudicious’ voters had led a ‘corrupt interest’ into
allowing men of ‘inconsiderable estates’ and understanding to vote in the
Wiltshire election, their aim being to intermeddle ‘in state matters’ and
raise ‘factions’ to create a ministry of their bidding, and ‘imbroyle the
Nations in blood’ by pulling it back into war.15 Cooper suggested England
9 [Cooper], A copie of the kings message sent by the duke of Lenox (London, 1644), pp. 1, 5–6.
10 Haley, First earl, pp. 47–9.
11 H. Chambers, A. Birfield, J. Strickland, and P. Ince, An apology for the ministers of the county of
Wilts, in their actings at the election of members for the approaching parliament (London, 1654), pp. 1–2,
15, 16.
12 Christie, A life of Anthony Ashley Cooper, I, pp. 112–13; Haley, First earl, pp. 81–3.
13 [Cooper], Letter sent out of Wiltshire to a gentleman in London, wherein is laid open the dangerous
designes of the clergy in reference to the approaching parliament, ed. C. H. Firth, The memoirs of
Edmund Ludlow (2 vols., Oxford, 1894), I, pp. 545–6, 548.
14 Ibid., p. 545.
15 Ibid., pp. 545, 547.
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should become secularized like Holland, where the law prevented the clergy
from intrusion in the state. Religion and perceived interference by the clergy
in politics was a recurrent theme in his speeches and works. While this is com-
monly attributed to a fear of Catholicism, his accusations during the
Protectorate era point to a deeper dislike of the clergy per se. This was juxta-
posed with the intrusion upon people’s consciences and free worship, plus the
clergy’s ability to deceive the people of their liberties through persuasion and
pressure for the executive. Such destabilization of free government by church
engagement in the state was a form of tyranny for Cooper. His Protestantism
may therefore have possessed a staunch hostility towards Catholicism, but he
was also disinclined to the priestcraft of his own religion.16
Cooper’s move from the royalists when they were doing well is a second
consideration, because it was driven by his ‘conscience’ rather than ambition
or glory. The conduct of the royalists to Cooper’s mind smacked of absolutism,
interference in the religion of the English via support for Catholicism, and a
nonsensical disregard for public welfare. This more sympathetic evaluation
of Cooper’s actions is perhaps sustained by his break with the Lord
Protector on 28 December 1654. Unable to persuade Cromwell to become
king as a means of restraining him, Cooper was alarmed by the increasingly
tyrannical and militaristic nature of the Commonwealth. Arbitrary pretensions
in the executive and movements towards ‘absolutism’ enslaved the people and
necessitated tyrannical rule.17 As a member of the council of state named in
the Instrument of Government, he had drafted the workings of the council
and government. Fundamental to the Instrument was that government
(Protector and parliament) were to think of ‘the care, wisdom and gravity of
this House…[for] the interest of the people’ and not that of ‘the single per-
son’.18 After the chaotic behaviour of a Barebones Parliament (1653) domi-
nated by religious and political zealots, Cromwell’s Protectorate became
more militaristic. The army transformed from ‘the Champions of our
Liberty’ to ‘the instruments of our Slavery’, as Cromwell ‘rendered all
Englishmen no better than his Vassals’ and made ‘himself an absolute Lord
and Tyrant over three potent Nations’.19
Cooper cut his political teeth at this time when members proved to be
‘adept, elusive of “party”, fluid in their allegiances’, and highly sophisticated
politicians. Instead of focusing on divisions and blame for the Civil War and
Regicide, the council of state brought together individuals who had to be
16 See Mark Goldie, ‘Priestcraft and the birth of whiggism’, ch. 10 in Nicholas Phillipson and
Quentin Skinner, eds., Political discourse in early modern Britain (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 228–9.
17 Haley, First earl, pp. 29, 66, 141, 740–1; Plumb, ‘First earl’, p. 268; and Tim Harris, ‘Cooper,
Anthony Ashley, first earl of Shaftesbury’, Oxford dictionary of national biography (2004): www.
oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-1012035?
rskey=7LYr19&result=1.
18 Cooper in Thomas Burton, Diary of Thomas Burton, esq. member in the parliaments of Oliver and
Richard Cromwell from 1656 to 1659, ed. John Towill Rutt (4 vols., London, 1828), III, p. 227.
19 [Silius Titus/Edward Sexby?], Killing noe murder. Briefly discourst in three questions ([London?],
1657), p. 3; and A declaration of the free-born people of England, now in armes against the tyrannie and
oppression of Oliver Cromwell, esq. ([London?], 1655).
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flexible in their approach and willing to work with a broad spectrum of people
to shape a new England.20 When restored to parliament in January 1658 follow-
ing an eighteenth-month exclusion, he returned amidst the continuing debates
of the Humble Petition and Advice (from 1657) and liaised with assorted oppo-
sitionists to undermine the government. Irrespective of Cromwell rejecting the
crown offered in the Humble Petition, the installation of ‘a hereditary protect-
orate, with extremely limited powers for Parliament’ generated anxieties of
tyranny.21 As did discussion of the re-establishment of a second chamber
(‘the Other House’) nominated by Cromwell. This furnished a platform for
MPs to raise wider concerns, as Cooper and others used a 1620s tactic of
exploiting key issues and controlling deliberations.
In terms of Cooper’s opposition to Cromwell, his unwavering values of
resistance to tyranny, the belief in the rule of law, free parliament, and liberty
and rights are evident. Cromwell’s executive was deemed to have ‘subverted by
force and fraud of late year’ the ‘Rights, Liberties, Properties of all English free-
men’.22 This had been achieved by the manipulation of parliament and menace
of force by the army, which had dishonoured An agreement of the people (1649)
by ignoring the ‘SUPREME AUTHORITY’ of the freemen as its masters.23
Cooper’s own intervention in parliament during the Humble Petition debate
spoke of the unfettered support of the judiciary, alleging it would unquestion-
ably consent to whatever the Protector proclaimed law. On 11 February 1658,
Cooper stated that ‘[n]ever was so absolute a Government if the Florentine
[Machiavelli] and he that sate in the great chair of the world [Pope
Alexander VI], had…met together, they could not have made a thing so abso-
lute’.24 The main thrust of Cooper’s quarrel was that one way or another, and
no matter how long it took, with the endorsement of the ‘Gentlemen of the
long robe’ ( judges) Cromwell would eventually make the Humble Petition
and Advice law without parliament. This placed ‘the interest of the person
[Cromwell]’ over the ‘people’, which ‘was not consistent with the care, wisdom,
and gravity of this House’.25 Such executive action subjugated the ‘free’ minds
of the English and neutered parliament, in a strategy that ‘left a bone of
contention to posterity’.26
Following the death of Cromwell in September 1658 and accession of his son
Richard (1626–1712), Cooper declared on 28 March 1659 that reconstructing a
nominated ‘Other House’ with a negative voice gave the Protector (backed by
20 Sean Kelsey, ‘Constructing the council of state’, Parliamentary History, 22 (2003), pp. 217–41, at
pp. 240–1.
21 See Jonathan Fitzgibbons, ‘Hereditary succession and the Cromwellian Protectorate: the offer
of the crown reconsidered’, English Historical Review, 128 (2013), pp. 1095–128; and J. T. Peacey,
‘Nibbling at Leviathan: politics and theory in England in the 1650s’, Huntington Library Quarterly,
61 (1998), pp. 241–57, at p. 255.
22 [William Prynne], Demphilos, or the assertor of the people’s rights (London, 1658), pp. iv–v.
23 Ibid., p. v; and Prynne, A brief necessary vindication of the old and new secluded members, from the
false malicious calumnies (London, 1659), pp. 61–2.
24 Burton, Diary, III, p. 228.
25 Ibid., III, p. 227.
26 Ibid., III, pp. 228–9.
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the judiciary) absolute authority.27 He purported that the Protector would be
‘possest of two parts of the Legislative Power which would mean “an intoler-
able…Arbitrary Power”’.28 Cooper expressed one articulation of disquiet con-
cerning the nature of a second chamber amongst others. Another argued
that the creation of a second nominated House had been born from ‘an under-
ground Plot’ that would cheat the people of the ‘Good Old Cause’ and inaugur-
ate a hereditary senate.29 Its accusation that the executive was merely replicat-
ing the previous monarchy was a point of alarm for many, who felt it betrayed
their escape from Egyptian slavery. Monarchy and its court had led to ‘Schisms
and Heresies’, burdened the people with taxes, and removed peace and liberty
by cultivating ‘a Land of Confusion’.30 The return of the hereditary nobility,
especially, contradicted an equal commonwealth in its dependence upon the
‘Tyrannie of Custome’ and ‘Pyramids of Greatness’, which permitted the nobil-
ity to enrich themselves and their greatness to the detriment of the people.31
Yet during the mounting peril of a tyrannical executive defended by a tyr-
annical army, there were growing calls to advance the position and experience
of the ancient nobility at a period of crisis. In a time of ‘licentious Quills,
Tongues od lawless sordid Sectaries, and Mechanick Levellers’ with the
‘Sword’ in their hands the ancient nobility should stand against them.32
Rather than reverting to the Instrument of Government, parliament should
reject the Humble Petition by revisiting the Triennial Act (1641). It would
reinstate ‘the antient Peers’ and with it, justice for ‘the Peace, Prosperity, secur-
ity of the English Nation’.33 Cooper similarly appealed for the return of the her-
editary nobility as the second chamber in parliament.34 Condemning a clause
that would not safeguard the rights of the old peers in the new ords, he
averred it was ‘natural’ for the nobility to be occupied within government,
an ancient role that would be of advantage.35 Cooper sought to thwart the
abuse of authority by the executive and to uphold ‘an oligarchic, but literally
interpreted rule of law against military rule’.36
Selected as a non-member of the House to the council of state in 1659,
Cooper considered the paternalistic and sober ancient nobility to be an anti-
dote for growing militarism. While Fleetwood and others avowed the army
was working in the interests of the people and parliament,37 Cooper worked
27 Ibid., IV, pp. 21, 284.
28 [Cooper], A seasonable speech, made by a worthy member of parliament in the House of Commons
concerning the Other House…March 1659 (London[?], 1659), pp. 2–3.
29 [Anonymous], A negative voyce: or, a check for your check ([London?], 1659), pp. 6, 10.
30 [William Sprigg], A modest plea for an equal common-wealth against monarchy (London, 1659), pp.
viii–ix.
31 Ibid., pp. 75–7.
32 William Prynne, A plea for the Lords and the House of Peers (London, 1659), p. 1.
33 [Anonymous], A probable expedient for present and future publique settlement (London, 1658), p. 1.
34 Ibid., pp. 3, 5–6; and Spurr, ‘Shaftesbury and the seventeenth century’, p. 13.
35 [Cooper], Seasonable speech, p. 6.
36 Haley, First earl, p. 108.
37 See The Lord General Fleetwoods answer to the humble representation of Colonel Morley ([London],
1659), pp. 22–3; and [Cooper?], The remonstrance and protestation of the well-affected people of the cities
of London, Westminster…the 13th October 1659 (London, 1659), pp. 16–17.
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with the Republicans to prevent military dictatorship. He, Thomas Scot
(d. 1660), and others in the council employed force to take the Tower of
London to prevent it coming into the possession of Lord Fleetwood’s army.
In A letter, the authors pointed out that they were acting for parliament to pre-
serve the ‘Peace and Liberty of these Nations’ against Fleetwood. Moreover, as
‘the sole law full Authority’, parliament championed General Monk in the
interest of the Commonwealth. The authors elucidated a clear dichotomy
the people faced between two paths: tyranny of ‘the Sword’ or ‘Civil
Authority’.38
Following the Letter, the Remonstrance and protestation contended that the
abuses of Charles I –misuse of parliament, raising taxes and levies without
consent, use of the militia, the Star Chamber, and a tyrannical army – had
been replicated by the equally arbitrary Cromwell.39 He had subverted ‘the
fundamental Laws and Principles of Government, upon which the Land was
firmly established’, and prevented the formation of a ‘free state’ as the
‘Rampant Sword’ endeavoured ‘to seat itself for ever upon us, and intayle an
Army to posterity over us, for the Government of these Nations’.40 As had
been seen with ‘many Tyrants and Monarchs in former times’, the ‘Arbitrary
Power’ of the army offered ‘a most absolute servitude’ and the ‘Blood of
Innocents’.41 Evident under Charles I, the engagement of military dictatorship
was not only illegal, it instituted tyranny either through a single individual or
a ‘mechanic tyranny’ in which (some of the common) people ruled through the
army.42
From 1660, Cooper sensed that the restoration of the Stuarts via the efforts
of the ‘noble Patriot and gallant Assertor of English Rights’, General Monk, was
the best method for achieving a free parliament.43 An idea born in the 1620s
but repeatedly thwarted between 1642 and 1660, it was clear that the
Commonwealth had failed and restoration could beget a free parliament.44
Cooper and many others had genuinely endeavoured to achieve a free govern-
ment; nevertheless, the ‘hand of Providence’ led them ‘through various forms
of government, and had given power into the hands of several sorts of men,
but he had given none of them a heart to use it as they should’.45
Restoration presented the prospect of achieving a free government under a
grateful monarchy rather than a collapsing republic prone to arbitrary
conduct.
38 [Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper, Thomas Scot, Io Berners, and John Weaver], A letter (London[?],
1659), pp. 3, 4.
39 [Cooper?], Remonstrance, p. 1. This article accepts Haley’s contention that the work bears strik-
ing similarities to Shaftesbury’s speeches and works from 1675; First earl, p. 121.
40 [Cooper?], Remonstrance, p. 3.
41 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
42 Ibid., pp. 3–4, 7.
43 Ibid., p. 6.
44 See Blair Worden, ‘Oliver Cromwell and the Protectorate’, Transactions of the Royal Historical
Society, 20 (2010), pp. 57–83, at p. 83; Blair Worden, ‘The campaign for a free parliament, 1659–
60’, Parliamentary History, 36 (2017), pp. 159–84, at pp. 159–60.
45 Christie, A life of Anthony Ashley Cooper, II, pp. 251–3.
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II
In 1673, Cooper, now the first earl of Shaftesbury, came to realize that like
Cromwell Charles II did not possess ‘the heart to use’ government as he should.
He gave his famous Delenda est Carthago speech to parliament in early 1673 to
implore its continued subsidy of the Third Anglo-Dutch War. At some point
after this speech, he discovered that the treaty he had helped sell to parlia-
ment, which allied England with France against the Dutch for commercial
superiority, fronted a secret treaty, in which Charles II had acquiesced to con-
vert to Catholicism and furnish assistance against the Dutch in exchange for a
pension from Louis XIV.46 Concern over tyrannical governmental power led to
his resignation as the lord chancellor (1672–3), once Shaftesbury discovered
that the Treaty of Dover he had signed in 1670 was a lie. From this point,
and for the remainder of his life, he became a committed opponent to the
court led by the earl of Danby between 1674 and 1678, which appeared to pro-
mote closer ties with the French and a move towards popery and arbitrary
government.
From 1673, Shaftesbury and other like-minded peers used the restored for-
tunes of the nobility to take on the court’s secret plans to alter Protestantism
and government. Throughout, Shaftesbury’s targets were consistent with the
values demonstrated in the 1650s: the promotion of the rule of law and a
free parliament to repel tyranny, and preserving the rights and liberties of
England. What became more apparent in his solution to monarchical tyranny
was the independence and restraint proffered by the nobility, and its wider
appeal for public support to place pressure on the court and Charles II. The
catalyst for the works and speeches of Shaftesbury and his circle was
Danby’s introduction of a Test Oath on 15 April 1675 – later to become the
Test Act (1678) –which office-holders in both houses of parliament were to
swear concurring it was not permissible to resist the king or his ministers,
and to refrain from endeavours to alter church or state government as recog-
nized by law. Shaftesbury led the opposition that defeated the bill by one vote
fifteen days later, asserting it was sometimes lawful to resist the king’s minis-
ters and the Protestant Reformation had shown it necessary to sometimes cor-
rect error in the church. This parliamentary skirmish with Danby exacerbated
another wrangle between the Lords and Commons over their jurisdictions in
the case of Shirley versus Fagg.
In the Shirley versus Fagg debate of November 1675, the question centred
on which House could hear appeals from the lower courts when a case involved
members of the Commons: Sir John Fagg was the MP for Steyning and had been
taken to the Lords on appeal by Dr Thomas Shirley over a property dispute.47
Shaftesbury and other peers reinforced this attack on the Commons and Danby,
46 Ashcraft, Revolutionary politics, pp. 17–20, 115–16. According to Ashcraft, Shaftesbury was made
aware of the treaty by one of his fellow (CABAL) council members, either Lord Arlington (who
signed the secret treaty) or the duke of Buckingham (who signed the spurious version with
Shaftesbury). The latter was responsible according to the Shaftesbury family (p. 115 n. 148).
47 ‘Shirley v. Fagg, 1675’, in J. P. Kenyon, ed., The Stuart constitution, 1603–1688: documents and
commentary (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1989), pp. 425–6.
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calling a motion to have parliament dissolved for fresh elections – the Cavalier
Parliament had been extant since 1661 –which was defeated by two votes.
Shirley versus Fagg was shut down when the king prorogued parliament on
22 November, announcing that it would not sit again until 15 February
1677.48 The implementation of kingly prerogative for the second time in six
months was perceived as an assault on the peer’s power and attack on religious
and political rights and freedoms, inspiring the response from Shaftesbury and
his circle.
Shaftesbury’s speeches took place and pamphlets were published prior to
and during the Shirley versus Fagg debate in October and November 1675,
although the infamous Letter from a person of quality to his friend in the country
was composed after the first prorogation (June) and published in November.
The overwhelming concern of the Letter is the attack upon Protestant freedoms
occurring in England.49 It argued that the church party within parliament had
pursued the ends of the high episcopacy and old Cavaliers and allied itself to
the monarchy to achieve the aims of the high church through the Act of
Uniformity (1662) which threatened dissenters from the Declaration of
Indulgence. Apprehensions over the shift towards arbitrary monarchy and
the use of a standing army were born from a fear – present since the sixteenth
century – that these instruments would provide the means to impose
Catholicism on to the nation by a popish prince. Evoking his alarm during
the 1650s of interference by the established church in politics, the executive
could use religion to imperil religious and civil rights. Sharing the concerns
of the duke of Buckingham, the Declaration of Indulgence instigated further
disquiet as it proffered toleration and promotion for Catholicism, which
could be potentially spread via the parish system to the people to enforce
the king’s will undermining Protestantism in England.50
In the opinion of the Letter, the church was shadowing the court with its
own agenda, which had been made evident through the oath of the Test Act
(1673). Such an oath was worthy of the ‘Church of Rome’, positioning as it
did the king underneath the power of the church, and framing a government
that was ‘more Absolute, and Arbitrary’ as manifest from the use of Archbishop
Laud’s divine right theory. Applying natural (divine) law over positive (human)
law was a naked manoeuvre to remove freedom, by precluding rebellion and
situating the monarch under the power of the ‘Bishops’ when it should be
the reverse.51 In his speech in parliament on 20 October, Shaftesbury empha-
sized the ‘Episcopal’ clergy’s ‘Popish’ belief in the divine right theory of kings.
It usurped positive law and the ‘Magna Carta’, according to Shaftesbury,
48 Harris, ‘Shaftesbury’, ODNB.
49 On authorship of the Letter and John Locke’s role, see Haley, First earl, pp. 390–1; Ashcraft,
Revolutionary politics, p. 134; Goldie, ‘Priestcraft and the birth of whiggism’; and Paul Seaward,
‘Shaftesbury and the royal supremacy’, ch. 3 in Spurr, ed., Anthony Ashley Cooper, pp. 51–2.
50 See [Shaftesbury], Letter from a person of quality to his friend in the country (London, 1675), pp. 1–2,
4–6; and Buckingham, The duke of Buckingham’s speech in the House of Lords, November 16 1675
(Amsterdam, 1675), pp. 13–14. Both were lauded in their endeavours by Andrew Marvell; An account
of the growth of popery and arbitrary government in England (London, 1677), p. 61.
51 [Shaftesbury], Person of quality, pp. 16–17, 24–5.
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because it subjugated parliament and the people under the king and enabled
him to assault their property, rights, and justice in the name of God and
obedience.52
The natural conflation of religious and civil issues during this period is
highlighted in Shaftesbury’s discussions of the peril faced by the English
under Danby’s pro-high-church direction. Both religious and civil liberty
were seen to be under assault by the court’s power-grab, which generated fore-
bodings of another rebellion and civil war. The use of divine right theory and
the Test Oath were a move towards arbitrary government because they strove
to stultify rebellion, at a time when the risk of rebellion was necessary to
thwart the shift towards French tyrannical government. Charles II’s changes
to lawful government ran the risk of repeating the events that led up to the
Civil War under his father by removing the right to self-defence, and a stand-
ing army could be directed against private individuals and their property.53
The separation between the court’s perspective and several peers and other
countrymen was exposed in the dichotomy within the Cavalier Parliament.
For Shaftesbury and his circle, two old Civil War enemy camps were sitting
together and still held distinct views: the ‘old Cavalier’ and ‘the
Round-head’.54 While the ‘old Cavalier’s’ loyalty was to the episcopacy and
church and their interest for the crown, the ‘Round-head’ supported a free con-
science. The court was offering the ‘Round-head’ faction and ‘Country
Gentlemen’ a liberty of conscience if they agreed to its civil plans, all the
while the king continued to prorogue, adjourn, and dissolve parliament.
Grievances were therefore left unresolved as issues were not addressed and
time wasted, frustrating those who dreaded the direction of England.55
This was part of a wider interference in the running of parliament by the
king and court. Shaftesbury had already fired shots at the Commons in his
speech of 20 October, proclaiming that the ‘Kings Ministers’ in the Commons
were reporting back to the king ‘daily’ and thereby hindering the independ-
ence of parliament and impeding its ‘Ability’ and ‘Integrity’.56 In a speech
delivered on 20 November 1675, Shaftesbury repeated the placemen accusation
of the Wiltshire Letter (1654) by asking how many MPs ‘by the favour and
Goodness of the Prince…[had] become officers in the Court’, which, in turn,
prevented them from representing the ‘Interest’ of the people that elected
them.57 The essence of representation had been further eroded by keeping
the same men in parliament since 1661, eliminating the accountability of
MPs. In Shaftesbury’s opinion, the manipulation of parliament by the crown
to achieve its ends through prorogation, dissolvement, and the number of
52 [Shaftesbury], Two speeches…House of Lords the 20th of October, 1675 (Amsterdam, 1675), pp. 10–11.
53 [Shaftesbury], Person of quality, pp. 16–18.
54 [Shaftesbury], A letter from a parliament man to his friend, concerning the proceedings of the House
of Commons this last sessions, begun the 13th of October, 1675 (London[?], 1675), pp. 1–2.
55 Ibid., p. 2.
56 [Shaftesbury], Two speeches, p. 3.
57 [Shaftesbury], Two seasonable discourses concerning this present parliament, in Joyce Lee Malcolm,
ed., The struggle for sovereignty: seventeenth-century English political tracts (2 vols., Indianapolis, 1999),
I, pp. 593–4.
The Historical Journal 11
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X21000662
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.134.68.23, on 23 Sep 2021 at 09:10:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
MPs acting for the ‘Cabals and Interest at Court’ had made government
ineffective.58
One month later, Shaftesbury used common law to argue that in accordance
with ‘the Constitution of the Government, the ancient Laws and Statutes of this
Realm…there should be frequent and new Parliaments’.59 As Lord Denzil Holles
(1598–1680), his friend and member of the same group, made clear, proroga-
tion of parliament for more than a year was contrary to statute (4 Edw. 3
c. 14 and 36 Edw. 3 c. 10).60 Regular parliaments had been customary until
the reign of Edward III (r. 1327–77), which denoted that Charles II’s was contra-
vening the law, custom, common law, and the ancient constitution by abusing
the prerogative. He called on the king to hold elections in the interests of the
nation to freshen parliament and guarantee accountability.61 This would pro-
pitiate a nation concerned about the court’s movement towards French arbi-
trary government and French interference in English affairs, at a time when
the aggrandizement of Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715) strove for ‘Universal
Monarchy’.62
In Shaftesbury’s opinion, the Lords and the Commons held clearly defined
roles: the Lords as the ‘Judicature’ should ‘redress Grievances’ and ‘Maintain
the Old Land-Marks’ but not make new law, and the Commons’ ‘Business is
to complain Your Lordships to redress’.63 The Commons retained the ‘Sence,
the Mind, the Information, the Grievances, and the desires of all those
People whom they serve’, and the Lords were ‘the Councill, the Wisdom, and
Judgement of the Nation’ while the king gave ‘Life and Vigour to the proceedings
of the other Two’.64 Referring back to the king’s Answer to the nineteen proposi-
tions (1642), Shaftesbury maintained that if the three parts of government did
not work effectively it would undermine the public good, and if there was
interference, it led to ‘private Interests’ and factions that further eroded
their service to the nation. For Shaftesbury, the House of Lords was under
attack from the Commons and the crown. While promising to ‘serve my
Prince as a Peer’, he warned against undermining the Lords as a body because
parliament would lose the independence that had secured peace for the nation
in the last two years and prevented the French from profiting by the European
situation.65 Within the Commons, some of the gentry and commoner MPs were
more focused on advancing their own private interests at the expense of the
House of Lords.66
58 Ibid., p. 596.
59 Ibid., p. 592.
60 [Denzil Holles], Some considerations upon the question, whether the parliament is dissolved by its pro-
rogation for 15 months? (London, 1676), pp. 5, 12.
61 [Shaftesbury], Two speeches, pp. 7, 9.
62 [Denzil Holles], The British constitution consider’d, with a character of the court and parliament in
the year 1676 (London, 1712), pp. 3–4, 14.
63 [Shaftesbury], Two speeches, pp. 6–7.
64 [Shaftesbury], Two seasonable, p. 595.
65 [Shaftesbury], Two speeches, pp. 7–8, 9.
66 Ibid., pp. 597–8.
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Shaftesbury’s solution was twofold. The first was to audit the boroughs and
reduce the franchise. He considered the ‘Parliament of England…[to be] that
Supreme and absolute Power which gives life and Motion to the English
Government’. It was dangerous for the king to control the franchise, and
Shaftesbury dismissed the idea that representation in parliament was a gift
from God.67 The boroughs required an audit because there was a surfeit of rea-
sons (‘titles’) justifying why boroughs had an MP, and the glut of sitting MPs
necessitated an excess of grievances and petitions when parliament sat,
which retarded its business. There was a further issue with some geographical
areas possessing too much power due to their disproportionate number of bor-
oughs (Cornwall had forty-three MPs), which created a parliament that could
be swayed by local interests. The franchise should be reduced to only allow
‘Men of Substance’ (over £40 per annum) to vote, so that poorer voters
could not be financially induced ‘to a contrary Interest’ because they were eas-
ily ‘Corrupted and Seduced’.68 Courtiers through ‘the strength of their Purse,
and liberal Baits…so seduced these poor Rural Animals, as to obtain an
Election from them, though to the ruin and overthrow of their own Laws
and Liberties’. Shaftesbury had no qualms about reducing and regulating the
franchise as ‘the Majority is generally of a mean and abject fortune in the
World’ and ‘misguided also by their ignorance’. It was not practical for every
person to possess ‘a Natural Right to Vote’, and the country gentry should con-
trol local offices and elections while ensuring only ‘the most eminent Persons
for Wealth, Gravity, and Wisdom in the Parish’ should vote. These voters chose
MPs that represented ‘the whole Body of the People’ and all persons in the
kingdom, so should vote in secret to relieve pressure from them and avoid
corruption.69
The desire to pursue electoral reform was a continual theme throughout the
seventeenth century. Due to the tension between the Commons and both
James I (r. 1603–25) and Charles I (r. 1625–49), from 1621 reform was promul-
gated as a means of opposing the crown. Such ideas were not concerned with
popular sovereignty or extending the franchise for democratic purposes but
instead to contest intrusion from the court in elections and the selection of
candidates, mayors, and bailiffs. Many boroughs could be unruly, especially
in the country, and this was regularly caused by venality and abuse by the
local elites; indeed, Charles II wanted to fill parliament with placemen aided
67 [Shaftesbury], Some observations concerning the regulating of elections for parliament (London,
1689), pp. 5–7, drafted in 1679; see John Cannon, Parliamentary reform 1640–1832 (Cambridge,
1973), p. 19.
68 [Shaftesbury], Regulating of elections, pp. 12–13.
69 Ibid., pp. 15–16, 18. On representation, see Edward S. Morgan, Inventing the people: the rise of
popular sovereignty in England and America (New York, NY, 1988), pp. 48–50, 60–1; Alan Cromartie,
‘Parliamentary sovereignty, popular sovereignty, and Henry Parker’s adjudicative standpoint’, in
Quentin Skinner and Richard Bourke, eds., Popular sovereignty in historical perspective (Cambridge,
2016), pp. 157–8, 160–1; and Eric Nelson, ‘Representation and the fall’, Modern Intellectual History,
17 (2020), pp. 647–76, at pp. 662–3.
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by a loyalist church.70 What is noteworthy is that Shaftesbury inverted this
earlier call to extend the franchise to oppose the crown. His experiences of
elections in the Commonwealth period had led him to the conclusion that
voters of ‘inconsiderable estates’ were too ‘injudicious’ in their choices and
prone to (financial) exploitation by the clergy and court.71 Besides, like
many of his contemporaries, Shaftesbury was ‘deeply suspicious’ of ‘the multi-
tude’.72 What makes Shaftesbury a complex and often misunderstood politician
was that while his experiences prior to 1660 had made him fear the mob and
despise democracy, it likewise made him comprehend that the people were
indispensable.73 The capacity to propagate public pressure through pamphle-
teering against the crown or opposition was a lesson from the 1640s pamphlet
war he gleefully embraced and applied from 1675. Crucially, this was to serve
the nobility against the crown and Commons, but it was born from the knowl-
edge that the people were themselves a source of tyranny. In taking control of
local government with the assistance of the gentry, the nobility could control
the country populace and resist monarchical centralization.
III
Shaftesbury’s second solution was the promotion of the nobility within gov-
ernment. In his speech to parliament in March 1659, Shaftesbury had advo-
cated the role of nobility within government, arguing that for ‘Great Men to
govern ‘tis ordinary: for Able Men ‘tis natural’.74 He accepted (while citing
Livy), that although the nobility could impact ‘the People’s liberty and
patience’, its ancient role was to occupy the key positions in government
and provide hereditary council. This was because the nobility had been bred
for leadership, consolidated by their education, which put them in possession
of ‘good Arms and good Shoulders, then good Heads’.75 Charles I had under-
mined the nobility prior to the Civil War through ‘personal rule’ and by ennob-
ling new peers loyal to him, a stratagem of Jeroboam and a number of
European countries such as Portugal and Spain. Nevertheless, hereditary nobil-
ity offered the vital component within government by protecting both the
people and the monarch. They protected the ‘Old Land-Marks’ (constitution),
70 See William Gibson, ‘The limits of the confessional state: electoral religion in the reign of
Charles II’, Historical Journal, 51 (2008), pp. 27–47, at p. 28; and James Harris, ‘Partisanship and popu-
lar politics in a Cornish “pocket” borough, 1660–1714’, Parliamentary History, 37 (2018), pp. 350–68,
at p. 368.
71 [Cooper], Wiltshire, pp. 545, 548.
72 J. H. Plumb, ‘The growth of the electorate in England from 1600 to 1715’, Past & Present, 45
(1969), pp. 90–116, at p. 109.
73 See Tim Harris, Restoration: Charles II and his kingdoms, 1660–1685 (London, 2005), pp. 143–5, 219–
20, 415–17; Tim Harris, ‘Publics and participation in the Three Kingdoms: was there such a thing as
“British public opinion” in the seventeenth century?’, Journal of British Studies, 56 (2017), pp. 731–53,
at p. 733; and Peter Lake and Steve Pincus, ‘Rethinking the public sphere in early modern England’,
Journal of British Studies, 42 (2006), pp. 270–92, at pp. 270, 274.
74 [Cooper], Seasonable speech, p. 6.
75 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
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and if they were to be removed, monarchy would again tumble ‘into a
Democraticall Republique’.76 More recently, their intervention in the Test Oath
had witnessed the nobility take a stand against the bill and remain independ-
ent, uncontaminated by the king or court’s money unlike the Commons. It was
the Lords that had salvaged the people’s religious and civil freedoms against
placemen, censorship, and an undermined parliament.77 The Letter claimed
that a ‘new Partie’ had emerged to defend the nation against the court and
its ‘weak councils’. This party included Shaftesbury, his allies, and other groups
of opposition that were to be later bracketed under the banner of whigs, or
whom Shaftesbury had categorized ‘Round-Heads’.78
Shaftesbury’s championing of the nobility within government and parlia-
ment was logical if one factors the absence of the House of Lords during the
Commonwealth, their rejuvenated fortunes by Charles II following the
Restoration, and his background. The nobility had struggled from the fifteenth
century when Henry VII capitalized on their diminution to sell off land to off-
set the cost of the War of the Roses, and strip away their juridical authority.
This was compounded in the sixteenth century as population growth and eco-
nomic problems forced the crown to sell off more estates (and church land) to
face the threat of Catholic Counter-Reformation.79 These Tudor financial pro-
blems, inherited by the Stuarts, had a twin effect. First, the gentry began to fill
positions in parliament as business moved towards the Commons and the
peers lost influence in central government. Employing the gentry in govern-
ment administration, alongside their increased wealth over the course of the
sixteenth century, led to their gradual dominance in parliament. The danger
posed by this new civil elite, their embrace of humanist education at univer-
sity, and their mocking of old feudal aristocratic militaristic values forced
the seventeenth-century nobility to acclimate and embrace some of these
developments, which they did while promoting aristocratic ideals.80
Indubitably, the nobility had a significant role in the Civil War and
Commonwealth eras, but it was not until the Restoration that the nobility’s for-
tunes took a sharp up-turn.81
76 [Shaftesbury], Two speeches, p. 7.
77 [Shaftesbury], Person of quality, pp. 10–15.
78 Ibid., pp. 32–3. This article views Shaftesbury as a member of one of several oppositional
groups, agreeing with Ashcraft, Revolutionary politics, pp. 176–80; and Melinda S. Zook, ‘The
Restoration remembered: the first whigs and the making of their history’, The Seventeenth
Century, 17 (2002), pp. 213–34, at pp. 224–5. For Shaftesbury as the whig leader, see J. R. Jones,
The first whigs: the politics of the Exclusion Crisis, 1678–1683 (London, 1961), pp. 6–7, 17–18, 33.
79 Jonathan Scott, How the old world ended: the Anglo-Dutch-American revolution, 1500–1800 (New
Haven, CT, 2019), pp. 98–100.
80 See Hillay Zmora, Monarchy, aristocracy and the state in Europe 1300–1800 (London, 2001), pp. 45–
6, 52–3, 81–2; Ronald G. Asch, Nobilities in transition 1550–1700: courtiers and rebels in Britain and Europe
(London, 2003), pp. 25–7, 55–6, 115–16; John Adamson, The noble revolt: the overthrow of Charles I
(London, 2007), pp. 7–8, 517–19.
81 See J. H. Hexter, ‘The English aristocracy, its crisis, and the English Revolution, 1558–1660’,
Journal of British Studies, 8 (1968), pp. 22–78, at pp. 74–8; John Cannon, Aristocratic century: the peerage
of eighteenth-century England (Cambridge, 1984), p. ix; and J. V. Beckett, The aristocracy in England,
1660–1914 (Oxford, 1986), pp. 27–8.
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Secondly, to improve the court’s finances and continue his own form of div-
ine right rule he employed in Scotland, James I pursued the centralization of
the state and government through favourites. King James made it clear to the
Commons that he did not share its self-image: as a source of counsel, the focal
point of government, the nation’s representative, and the saviour of the
Protestant religion in England.82 While tensions existed under James I, he
was able to largely navigate any problems with his estates, which did not
prove to be true of his son Charles I. Despite the nobility gaining parity
with royal officials under the Petition of Right (1628), King Charles’s
‘Personal Rule’ (1629–40) saw him not call parliament, raise direct taxes, use
the Star Chamber for ‘speedy justice’, and erode liberties further by imprison-
ing people (including peers) without charge.83 The contradistinctive theories
that were promulgated of ‘absolutism’ and ‘constitutionalism’ (or mixed gov-
ernment) continued to have a profound impact not only on the Civil War
but the Restoration. During the Restoration, medieval thought was combed –
conspicuously by Locke while in Shaftesbury’s service – to assert the ancient
juridical rights of the nobility, and reassert their capacity to act as a bridle
upon kings as a (Bractonian) ‘royal curia’. In the interest of the community,
peers not only shared in the rule of the king as his ‘noble companions’, they
had a duty to God to judge a tyrannical king and possessed the right to restrain
him.84 For Shaftesbury, the nobility were the only part of the constitution that
were independent and possessed the capability to ‘bridle’ the king in conson-
ance with ancient rights, custom, law, and justice.
According to J. G. A. Pocock, in his speech of 20 October 1675, Shaftesbury’s
‘image of the Lords as a pouvoir intermédiare’ is ‘straight Harringtonian doc-
trine’.85 Shaftesbury engaged the ‘Good Old Cause’ and Harringtonian repub-
lican language when confronting Danby’s ‘militant Anglicanism’ as it allied
with the king and began to corrupt parliament during that year. Shaftesbury
supplies the Neo-Harringtonian link between the Civil War’s ‘Good Old
Cause’ and the Commonwealthmen of the eighteenth century.86 Pocock sees
the year 1675 as incredibly significant, as the Letter from a person of quality
was published and the speeches made by Shaftesbury communicated disap-
proval towards Charles II’s and the court’s arbitrary machinations.
82 See Peter Lake, ‘The politics of “popularity” and the public sphere: the “monarchical republic”
of Elizabeth I defends itself’, in P. Lake and S. Pincus, eds., The politics of the public sphere in early
modern England (Manchester, 2007), pp. 78–81; and Joanna Paul, Counsel and command in early modern
English thought (Cambridge, 2020), pp. 173, 177–8.
83 David Wootton, ‘Introduction’, in D. Wootton, ed., Divine right and democracy: an anthology of
political writing in Stuart England (London, 1986), pp. 25–6.
84 See Janet Coleman, ‘Dominium in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century political thought and its
seventeenth-century heirs: John of Paris and Locke’, Political Studies, 33 (1988), pp. 73–100, at pp. 83,
90; C. J. Nederman, ‘Bracton on kingship first visited: the idea of sovereignty and Bractonian pol-
itical thought in seventeenth-century England’, Political Science, 40 (1988), pp. 49–66, at pp. 50–1, 53,
66; and idem, ‘The mirror crack’d: the speculum principum as political and social criticism in the
late middle ages’, The European Legacy, 3 (1998), pp. 18–38, at p. 24.
85 Pocock, ‘English political ideologies’, pp. 116–31.
86 Pocock, Machiavellian moment, pp. 406–9, 414–16; and idem, ‘Varieties of whiggism’, p. 226.
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Shaftesbury was of great import because he highlighted Danby’s creation of a
court party in the Commons, drew a link to a professional standing army and
its sinister connotations (especially for the nobility), and his trepidation that
the House of Lords may be extinguished. Shaftesbury’s innovation was that
he ‘restated the old antithesis of “Court and Country” in a new form, one
based upon the civic and republican concept of “corruption”’ (from
Harrington), while helping to develop ‘the theory known to us as the “separ-
ation of powers”’. His Neo-Harringtonian attack on the court and Charles II was
one that specifically concentrated on the corruption of the state and wider
society by the executive, and the development of the standing army to
upset the Gothic balance.87 Accepting Harrington’s assumption that the nobil-
ity had ceased to be a feudal aristocracy, Shaftesbury argued for an aristocracy
based on ‘talent and function’ within an English republic where the many were
not dependent on the few.88
Pocock’s republican vision of Shaftesbury and the rhetoric he employed
detaches him from historical experience and ascribes language to
Shaftesbury that is absent and ignores the deeper circumstantial concerns.
Pocock’s central claim focuses on Shaftesbury’s reference to the ‘two buckets’
of the nobility and a standing army in the Letter. Moreover, the ‘reference to
“neighbour Northern monarchies” is plain allusion to a common “Gothic” pat-
tern of free government’. The ‘Person of Quality has to explain its disappear-
ance and present the standing army as an agent of historical change’ using the
Gothic model.89 What the Letter was fearful of, however, was the menace posed
to the Protestant faith if the House of Lords was brought ‘low’ and ‘a Military
Government’ was established as some intended. The Letter does indeed state
that the ‘Power of Peerage and a standing Army are like two Buckets, the pro-
portion that one goes down the other exactly goes up’ and alludes to the exam-
ples of France and the Dutch.90 Shaftesbury’s point here was that the nobility
had stood against the government (king, court, church, and the placemen in
the Commons) as part of their ancient role of safeguarding the people and
Protestant faith. Possessing a keen eye for history and events occurring on
the continent, Shaftesbury and the Letter stressed two recent examples in
which nobilities had been imperilled by the development of a standing
army: in France (where the nobility had been successfully subdued) and in
the United Provinces (where they had not).
In many ways, it is not relevant whether Shaftesbury infrequently espoused
a Gothic or Harringtonian language in discussing the nobility, because his out-
look and goals were not republican or rooted in the (distant) past.91
87 Pocock, Machiavellian moment, pp. 406–9.
88 Ibid., pp. 414–16.
89 Pocock, ‘English political ideologies’, pp. 118–19, 119–20.
90 [Shaftesbury], Person of quality, p. 29.
91 On Pocock’s incorrect ascription of republican language to authors, see Isaac Kramnick,
‘Republican revisionism revisited’, American Historical Review, 87 (1982), pp. 629–64, at pp. 630–1; Ian
Hampsher-Monk, ‘Political languages in time – the work of J. G. A. Pocock’, British Journal of Political
Science, 14 (1984), pp. 89–116, at pp. 109–10; and Ian Shapiro, ‘J. G. A. Pocock’s republicanism and pol-
itical theory: a critique and reinterpretation’, Critical Review, 4 (1990), pp. 433–71, at pp. 449–52.
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Shaftesbury also did not have the same outcome for government as
Harrington, as he believed in retaining a monarch, (modern) commercial activ-
ity, and did not advocate the restraint of the nobility by a second chamber or
virtuous citizen soldiers. Certainly, throughout the works and speeches of
1675, the threat of a standing army is a recurring theme. Within the Letter,
the standing army was perturbing because it could be engaged to compel pri-
vate individuals to obey whoever controlled that army. This was a stark lesson
from the Civil War and Commonwealth eras, which Shaftesbury, many in par-
liament, and the country had experienced first-hand. As Shaftesbury had made
clear in the 1650s, reliance on an army set ‘the Sword’ against ‘Civil Authority’,
conceivably forcing individuals to act against their conscience or aid a mon-
arch in arbitrary government or popery through ‘Tirannical and oppressive
Government of the Sword’.92
Likewise, the ‘standing force’ was another form of prerogative, a coercive
power that could be directed against nonconformists. For Shaftesbury, the
Militia Act (1661) had enabled Charles II to replace the ‘Legal Militia’ with a
standing army, undermining the ‘Antient and true Strength of the Nation’.
Militias provided liberty for the people because they contained nobles, gentry,
and the local populace and enjoyed a much greater degree of parochial inde-
pendence than a professional army controlled by the king. Shaftesbury was
again not emulating Harrington’s view on militias or trying to generate civic
virtue, citizen-soldiers, or an agrarian society; instead, militia offered a prag-
matic means to defend liberty and local government, and secure elite influence
away from the tendrils of central government.93 As with his call to reform the
boroughs and elections, Shaftesbury was endeavouring to resist state central-
ization by preserving local political and military independence in the country.
Furthermore, Shaftesbury claimed that a standing army was costly and super-
fluous as it was largely left idle.94 Primarily, the greatest sin of a standing army
was its proclivity for tyranny, particularly the ‘mechanic tyranny’ evident dur-
ing the Protectorate under Cromwell: a militaristic state that used the army to
impose its will and popular government.
This appropriation of Shaftesbury to Pocock’s Neo-Harringtonian or repub-
lican teleology – from the Renaissance to the American Founding – is also
found in his discussion of the court and country dichotomy.95 Shaftesbury’s
willingness to emphasize a court party in parliament has been depicted by
Pocock as Machiavellian and Neo-Harringtonian. Yet there are two issues
with this claim. The first is that the court and country separation predates
Harrington (which Pocock acknowledges), and the second is that
Shaftesbury’s Commonwealth use also predates Harrington as he evidently
92 See [Shaftesbury], Person of quality, pp. 4, 6; [Cooper, Scot et al.], A letter, p. 4; and [Cooper?],
Remonstrance, p. 3.
93 See [James Harrington], The common-wealth of Oceana (London, 1656), pp. 1–2, 27, 59, 176, 273–4;
and Steve Pincus, ‘Neither Machiavellian moment nor possessive individualism: commercial society
and the defenders of the English Commonwealth’, American Historical Review, 103 (1998), pp. 705–36,
at pp. 707, 711–12, 724.
94 [Shaftesbury], Parliament man, p. 4.
95 Pocock, ‘English political ideologies’, pp. 124–6, 131–2.
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recognized that parliament contained (at least) two groups that were opposed
to each other: the ‘Cavaliers’ and ‘Round-Heads’. These two groups were philo-
sophically separated by misgivings and views on England’s religion and gov-
ernment that had fractured during the Civil War but had a much longer
pedigree, at least back to the sixteenth century.96 Shaftesbury’s encourage-
ment of discord between the court and the country had two motivations.
First, references to a court and country severance were a familiar trope in
the seventeenth century, and Shaftesbury utilized it as a call in his circle’s
campaign against the court while alluding to hidden plots as he had done in
the 1650s. Talk of ‘Court-Corruptions’ and the lost liberty of the ‘Country
Gentlemen’ were grist to the mill in firing prejudices many people held against
a profligate and devious court.97 Secondly, the dichotomy reflected the reality
that many nobles, gentry, and others who served in local (country) govern-
ment experienced in their dealings with the court as England moved towards
a more centralized administration through successive legislative acts, such as
the Clarendon Code Acts (1661–5), the Licensing of the Press Act (1662), the Act
of Settlement and Removal (1662), and the Triennial Act (1664). Shaftesbury’s
plea was therefore a tactic to rally support from those who identified with the
wider national ‘country’ interest against the various machinations of the court
and king, both in parliament and beyond.
Shaftesbury’s appeal to the country and wider people partly explicates his
tarnished reputation and the invective aimed at him when in opposition, not-
ably by Marchamont Nedham. Nedham’s overall point about Shaftesbury – plus
Dryden’s and Tate’s point during the Exclusion Crisis –was that he disingenu-
ously swayed the populace and country gentlemen for his own aristocratic
agenda. Nedham scoffed at his appeal to the ‘Men of the World’ and his desire
to walk Christ-like ‘among the Multitude’ as he mingled ‘Heaven and Earth’ to
address the people’s distress on ‘Indulgence, Trade, Religion, Kingdom and All’.98 It
was clear to Nedham that they were impressing the ‘sort of people that may be
easily plaid upon, and led by the nose to do what [the] other please’ through
his and his circle’s ‘sophistry’.99 Shaftesbury was a ‘Mephistopheles’ because he
offered the people what they wanted to hear on all subjects. He was
‘Ubiquitarian’ in religion, populist in politics, and anything the people required
as he claimed that he and other gentlemen were ‘like Workmen’ labouring with
the people to combat the ‘misery’ inflicted by ‘Courtiers’.100 His real agenda
was to establish ‘a Power purely Aristocratical’. Shaftesbury was not concerned
with religion or the rights and interests of the people, and his horror that the
96 See Keith Feiling, A history of the tory party, 1640–1714 (Oxford, 1924), pp. 13, 24–6; Keith
Thomas, ‘The Levellers and the franchise’, in G. E. Aylmer, ed., The Interregnum: the quest for settle-
ment, 1646–1660 (Basingstoke, 1972), pp. 60–1; and J. P. Sommerville, Politics and ideology in England,
1603–1640 (London, 1986), pp. 234–8.
97 [Shaftesbury], Parliament man, pp. 6–7.
98 [Nedham], Pacquet, pp. 8, 32, 51.
99 Ibid., pp. 52, 55.
100 Ibid., pp. 16, 32, 40, 51; and [Shaftesbury], Parliament man, p. 3.
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king wanted to make ‘Monarchy absolute, and Rule by an Army’ was a ‘Men of
Straw’ argument.101 Shaftesbury’s ‘design’ was the formation of a tyrannical
and levelling ‘Presbyterian Aristocratick’ state, making it ‘purely Aristocratical,
[and] directly contradistinct to the form of Monarchy’.102
These series of broadsides by Nedham do contain elements of truth. His
speeches and pamphlets make it clear that the issues highlighted and reforms
championed were not born from a Harringtonian or republican aspiration to
induce virtue or return to the past no matter what language he applied, but
pragmatic solutions to halt an assault by the executive. While the Exclusion
Crisis and Rye House Plot’s engagement of the duke of Monmouth as an alter-
native king suggest he wanted to retain the monarch, the crown’s role within
his mixed system is unclear. What is clear is that Shaftesbury’s political vision
of England was one in which the nobility played a leading role, restraining both
the (Stuart) monarchy and the Commons. This was part of a much larger social
and economic perspective in which the elevation of the nobility meant
enhanced liberty for them to pursue their own ends unencumbered by an arbi-
trary king. Rather than a backward-looking return to a distant feudal past,
Shaftesbury’s engagement in commerce, international trade, and colonialism
discloses him to be prescient. Interestingly, The fundamental constitutions of
Carolina: March 1, 1669 accentuate Shaftesbury’s commitment to the nobility
and advocate noble oligarchy in government under a distant king. The colony
was to be headed by a hereditary aristocratic oligarchy assisted by an artifi-
cially created hereditary nobility (of ‘caziques’ and ‘landgraves’) and freemen
controlling the labouring population, serfs (‘leetmen’), and slaves.
Shaftesbury’s vision was of an empire united by the crown as figurehead,
but led by an aristocracy that would prosper commercially.103
Charles II’s secret Treaty of Dover not only inspired Shaftesbury and others
to campaign against the perceived covert tyranny of the executive under
Danby, but to assert the necessity of the nobility.104 Going further,
Shaftesbury’s vision appears to offer an aristocratic constitutionalism that stul-
tifies executive overreach by exploiting two key factors: the historical role of
the nobility (with supporting theory), and its connection to the people. The
nobility drew from their historic social and legal position to claim their
ancient rights under statute demanded they serve the people as a bridle to
the king.105 Building upon medieval and scholastic works by the Conciliarists
and Monarchomachs, political theory and theology had asserted the rights
and duty of the noble few to resist, restrain, and even replace a king who
became tyrannical or threatened religion. Such ideas were prevalent in
101 [Nedham], Pacquet, pp. 41, 71–2.
102 Ibid., pp. 6, 40, 71.
103 See The fundamental constitutions of Carolina (London, 1670); and Thomas Leng, ‘Shaftesbury’s
aristocratic empire’, ch. 5 in Spurr, ed., Anthony Ashley Cooper.
104 [Shaftesbury], Two speeches, pp. 7–8. On Shaftesbury’s aristocratic perspective, see Plumb,
‘First earl’, pp. 269–70; Haley, First earl, p. 100; Marshall, ‘“Mechanic tyrannie”’, p. 37; and Mark
Goldie, The entering book of Roger Morrice: Roger Morrice and the puritan whigs, I (Woodbridge,
2009), pp. 181–2.
105 [Cooper], Seasonable speech, p. 6; and [Shaftesbury], Two seasonable, pp. 600–2.
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England from the sixteenth century.106 Within the republican tradition, too,
there was an indubitable desire for aristocratic leadership, which is evident
in Harrington’s, Milton’s, and Neville’s systems, for example, and continued
into the 1690s and the Augustan period.107 What is fascinating is that Pocock
and the Cambridge School have chosen to subsume the dominant aristocratic
bias within constitutionalism in favour of a representation of the whole (peo-
ple).108 It should be argued that relative to the Cambridge School, it would con-
sequently be more fitting to discuss two types of republicanism or
constitutionalism: one aristocratic and one popular.
This is not to make Shaftesbury a republican but instead to emphasize that
republican theory dating back many centuries, like constitutionalism, predom-
inantly favoured elite authority. This would be reflective of society, culture,
history, and politics in which the elite often under a single ruler dominated
the populace who accepted their place and lack of direct representation. One
reason why Shaftesbury is so important, however, is his recognition of the
integral role that the wider populace played in politics due to their numerical
power and genuine engagement with key issues, as evident to him from the
Civil War onwards. He applied a tried and tested sleight of hand going back
to classical times, in which he made aristocratic suspicions and resentments
the apprehensions of the people at large. This does not mean, however, that
Shaftesbury was a populist who wanted to widen popular participation and
incorporate them within broader government. Shaftesbury shared his peers’
trepidation of democracy and popular government, and the possibility of
‘mechanic tyranny’ in which the people managed to once more govern as
they had under Cromwell. Shaftesbury’s assessment of the people was that
they were largely ignorant, malleable, and prone to corruption. This made
them untrustworthy and dangerous, hence his aspiration to reorganize the
franchise and elections to limit their impact. It was not simply to prevent
influence from the court, but a deeper concern over their lack of self-control
and animalistic natures.109 The vast majority of the population were
106 See John Mair, A disputation concerning the authority of the council over the supreme pontiff, in
J. H. Burns, ed., Conciliarism and papalism (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 300–3; John Knox, On rebellion,
ed. Roger A. Mason (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 6, 137, 147; George Buchanan, De iure regni apud
Scotus (London[?], 1680), pp. 4, 19, 84, 117–18; John Pon[n]et, A short treatise of politique power
(London[?], 1642), pp. 3, 5–6, 51; and Thomas Smyth [Smith], De republica anglorum (London,
1584), pp. 33–5, 47.
107 See J[ohn] M[ilton], The readie and easie way to establish a free commonwealth (London, 1660),
pp. 25, 44–5, 49–51, 73, 94–5; [Harrington], Oceana, pp. 7, 13–14, 19–22; and Henry Neville, Plato
Redivivus (London, 1681), pp. 122–3, 253–7. Sir Henry Vane claimed that Harrington’s system was
led by a senate executive for the ‘Aristocracy’; A needful corrective or balance in popular government,
expressed in a letter to James Harrington (London, 1660), pp. 4–6.
108 Pocock, Machiavellian moment; Quentin Skinner, The foundations of modern political thought (2
vols., Cambridge, 1978); and idem, ‘A genealogy of the modern state’, Proceedings of the British
Academy, 162 (2009), pp. 325–70, at pp. 332–7. An issue highlighted by Paul A. Rahe, Against throne
and altar: Machiavelli and political theory under the English Republic (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 25–6; John
P. McCormick, Machiavellian democracy (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 10–11; and Jonathan Israel, The
Enlightenment that failed: ideas, revolution and democratic defeat, 1748–1830 (Oxford, 2019), pp. 73–4.
109 [Shaftesbury], Regulating of elections, p. 14.
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necessarily excluded from politics and should be controlled by their social
superiors for the advantage of the state and nation to preclude a
‘Democraticall Republique’.110 Yet by emulating the period between 1642 and
1660, the wider populace were drawn into the discussions and enmity towards
the court (and church), augmenting public pressure on the crown to change
course, as noble leadership was asserted.
IV
Establishing a more secure place under the king for the nobility was the least
of Shaftesbury’s aims from 1673. As has been demonstrated in this article,
Shaftesbury’s four values – belief in the rule of law, abhorrence of tyranny in
numerous forms, a desire for free parliament headed by the nobility (from
1659), and pursuit of rights and freedoms – remained consistent throughout
his time in politics. His vilified reputation aside, his ‘conscience’ guided his
behaviour against the executive in both the 1650s and 1670s. Shaftesbury
was determined to improve England’s government and sought a system that
would ensure the nourishment of these values for himself and his countrymen.
Pointedly, this comes with a caveat: that Shaftesbury particularly strove to
improve the fortunes of the nobility prior to the Restoration and once their
circumstances progressed from 1660. While these efforts proved to be unsuc-
cessful during his lifetime and faced a great deal of hostility from the court
and his fellow peers, in the longer term, lessons were learned from his warn-
ings and mistakes that helped to shape the 1688 Revolution and its aftermath.
From which time, oligarchic government progressively engendered constitu-
tional monarchy in a society that built upon Shaftesbury’s imprecise vision.
These interventions are of historiographical significance for two reasons.
First, while Shaftesbury’s aristocratic principles have been long discussed,
there is a belief that his use of the people and public opinion (anachronisti-
cally) signified that he was, or would have been, a devotee of an enlarged popu-
lar element in government and democracy. While it cannot be disputed that
Shaftesbury was keen to retain the Commons, membership would have been
restricted to make it more elite and the franchise vetted to scrutinize the
means and social standing of the voter. In his opinion, the people were to
be placated, managed, and feared through forms of manipulation that har-
nessed their activity but furthered aristocratic ends. Secondly, numerous con-
temporaries and forebears believed that the nobility had the (legal) status and
means to counteract monarchical power to ensure a free parliament, liberty,
and rights in accordance with their customary position. This aristocratic con-
stitutionalism defied monarchical and popular tyranny and sought to redefine
English sovereignty. In what had been an ongoing conflict from the sixteenth
century, Charles II inadvertently provided the nobility with the tools to make
this happen after more than two centuries of fragility. Likewise, the behaviour
of Charles II following that of his father Charles I led many nobles to judge that
the Stuarts could not be trusted and that breaking the ancient bond between
110 Ibid., p. 18; and [Shaftesbury], Two speeches, p. 7.
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the king and his peers offered freedom, protection, security in religion, and
greater power. For Shaftesbury, this was not born from a theoretical
Machiavellianism, but principles nurtured during his tumultuous political edu-
cation in the Civil War and Commonwealth. Unresolved religious and political
issues from the sixteenth century permeated the struggle between monarchy
and constitutionalists fighting over the boundaries of the executive and the
location of sovereignty in the constitution. In Shaftesbury’s opinion, the nobil-
ity possessed the independence and influence in local and central government
to restrain the monarchy and the people while delivering leadership.
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